I. Introduction
The Maastricht Treaty has envisaged the European Monetary Union (EMU) for Europe as an objective to be accomplished in three stages [Commission of the European Communities, 1990] . The treaty has become a law throughout the European Union (EU), and it is equivalent to a union-wide constitution. It has been ratified through a national referendum process or through the process of a majority parliamentary vote in all 12 member states of the union. In this respect, the Maastricht Treaty enjoys the political support of the national governments and of the majority of the European electorate.
The Maastricht Treaty proposes a revision of the Treaty of Rome that would make the EMU the cornerstone of EU. It lays down Europe's strategy to achieve monetary union by the end of the century, and it sets up the institutional framework for the stated objective.
The treaty sets: (a) a series of nominal convergence criteria which the member states have to satisfy in order to participate in the monetary union, and (b) a precise timetable leading to the EMU. These convergence criteria refer to inflation rates, a sustainable budgetary position, exchange rate stability, and nominal long-term interest rate convergence. 1 *Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece. Invited Address at the Thirty-Seventh International Atlantic Economic Conference, Athens, Greece, March 8-15, 1994 . Financial support by the Economic Research Center of the Athens University of Economics and Business is gratefully acknowledged.
The specific convergence criteria are: (a) The average rate of CPI inflation over the preceding 12 months must not exceed the inflation rates of the three lowest-inflation member states by more than 1.5 percent. (b) A country's long-term interest rates over the preceding 12 months must have been no more than 2 percent above those of the three best performing member states in terms of inflation. (c) A country's nominal exchange rates must have been within the normal European Monetary System fluctuation bands of + 2.25 percent for two years prior to entering the monetary union. (d) Budget deficits should be no larger than 3 percent of GDP, and gross public debts no larger than 60 percent of GDP. At this point, the following qualification is in order: excessive deficits (debts) exist if the deficit/GDP (debt/GDP) ratio exceeds 3 percent (60 percent) and if, in addition, it has not declined substantially and approached the 3 percent (60 percent) threshold at a satisfactory pace.
The Maastricht Treaty has raised serious questions about the appropriate processes adopted for accomplishing monetary union in Europe as well as the speed of adjustment of national monetary and government policies to meet the agreed objectives (for example, see Eichengreen [1992 ], Fratianni, et al. [1992 , Gros and Thygesen [1992] , Kenen [1992] , Minford, et al. [1992] ). The debate has gone beyond the simple criticism on the appropriateness of the convergence criteria, whether the approach to the monetary union is the proper strategy, or whether the treaty's axioms to the process of monetary union have disrupted the workings of the European Monetary System. However, the treaty suffers from a notable weakness, i.e., it does not make any provision concerning the creation of a (strong) federal institution to help the conduct of national fiscal policies.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the question of how national fiscal policies could be conducted in the EMU. Specifically, it addresses the following questions: (a) What does the theory of optimum currency areas say on the conduct of national fiscal policies in a monetary union? (b) Would the desirable EMU lead to the sustainability of the national public debt of the member states? (c) How do national fiscal policies relate to the EMU? and, (d) What is meant by fiscal discipline in the EMU?
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, a brief discussion of some of the problems which are associated with the theory of optimum currency areas and the conduct of national fiscal policies in a monetary union is presented. Section III presents the debt sustainability issue in the context of a monetary union, while section IV is devoted to a discussion of the determinants of debt dynamics. Section V is concerned with the interpretation of the restrictions imposed on fiscal policies by the Maastricht Treaty. Concluding comments are provided in section VI.
II. The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas and the Conduct of National Fiscal Policies in a Monetary Union
The paper does not discuss the question of whether EU is an optimum currency area [de Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke, 1991; Eichengreen, 1990] . Neither does it deal with the weaknesses of the theory of optimum currency areas. Rather, it reviews the insights of that theory in order to draw the relevant implications concerning the conduct of national fiscal policies in a monetary union [Eichengreen, 1990; Melitz, 1991; Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1992; de Grauwe, 1992; von Hagen and Neumann, 1992; Bini Smaghi and Vori, 1993] . Mundeil's [1961] celebrated article on optimum currency areas emphasizes three important aspects that are of great interest in analyzing the conduct of national fiscal policies in a monetary union. The first refers to the explicit assumption of money illusion and wage stickiness, while the second focuses on the implications of an asymmetric real demand shock, and the third deals with the assumption of labor mobility.
Consider a monetary union consisting of countries A and B. The interpretation of the theory of optimum currency areas in the case that country A is hit by an asymmetric demand shock, while country B is favored by an increase in aggregate demand, is the centralization of the national government budgets for the monetary union in order to neutralize the negative social consequences of the asymmetric shock3 The reasoning is
